Recent Articles in Volume 90, Issue 2 (2025)
By Max Birmingham – Which level of government—state or federal—has jurisdiction to set safety standards for aviation defect design is a nuanced issue. Generally speaking, federal law preempts state law in this context by occupying the field through a regulatory scheme that permeates aviation safety. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAAct) confers its namesake agency—the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—the powers to prescribe the “minimum standards required in the interest of safety.” The word “minimum” has been seized upon by those on the state side of the debate to advocate that it means the floor. And they contend that those in the Union have the freedom to set so-called higher standards—the ceiling. Granted, this may be a persuasive argument in some cases, but not here. First, the FAA has a five-stage type certification process. Further, there is a production certificate and airworthiness certificate. Second, the United States has executed treaties with foreign nations over reciprocity regarding aircraft safety standards. []
By Steven E. Bartz – The mainstream interpretation of State responsibility for Non-Governmental Entities (NGEs) with respect to their commercial operations in outer space may hinder the further development of the commercial space industry. Specifically, that interpretation produces broad responsibility for nation-states (States) under international law and derivative consequences for States and NGEs, but the international space community might avoid the otherwise harsh practical consequences that are likely to hamper the continued growth of commercial activities by NGEs in outer space by reexamining and reinterpreting a few aspects of existing law. This article (1) examines mainstream interpretations of State responsibility for NGEs with respect to their commercial operations in outer space; (2) embraces Curtis Schmeichel’s work and his rejection of “national activities” as an all-encompassing concept that renders States responsible for nearly all of their NGEs’ activities and extends his contextual analysis to the remainder of Article VI of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty or OST); and (3) proposes a reinterpretation of present international space law concerning State responsibility by arguing that the “authorization and continuing supervision” requirement with respect to NGEs, as set forth in the second sentence of OST Article VI, is independent of carrying out activities “in conformity with the provisions set forth in the [OST].” []
By Riley M. Wagstaff – Investigations following two separate and deadly crashes of Boeing 737 8 Max aircraft revealed that America’s most trusted manufacturer had failed to notify pilots and airliners alike of a new Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, commonly known as MCAS. What had first seemed like an accident unfortunately had a deeper and traceable history. Through relatively new United States legislation, Boeing was essentially permitted to oversee their own operations and grant airworthiness certifications for their own aircrafts. This practice is wholly unlike the detailed certification process of the European manufacturing giant, AirBus, by the European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA). This comment sheds light on the decades long build-up to these horrific crashes, how this series of events could have been prevented, and the ways in which the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Boeing can follow EASA and AirBus’s lead and return to the gold standard of civil aviation. Analyses of United States Codes, Federal Regulations, and International Safety Agreements leads to the conclusion that the United States and the FAA must apply more scrutiny to manufacturers within the 50 states. Alterations to the agreements and codes mentioned in this comment will aid in the overall safety practice of civil aviation. []